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NOTES
PRUDENTIAL STANDING LIMITATIONS ON
LANHAM ACT FALSE ADVERTISING CLAIMS
Gregory Apgar*
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a federal cause of action for
false advertising. There is considerable disagreement among the federal
circuit courts over the proper way to determine standing under this statute,
Much of the disagreement centers on how the plaintif's status as a direct
competitor of the defendant should affect the standing inquiry. This Note
argues that the five-factor test currently used by the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits is the best approach. Further,
this Note argues that an allegation of a commercial injury by a direct
competitor of the defendant satisfies this test.
INTRODUCTION
From 1995 to August 2001, McDonald's Corp. ran various promotional
games, including "Monopoly Games at McDonald's," "Who Wants to be a
Millionaire," and "Hatch, Match and Win."' Each of these games offered
customers the chance to win a variety of prizes, ranging from small cash
awards and free food or beverages to automobiles and cash prizes of $1
million.2 Customers won these prizes by collecting game pieces provided
with McDonald's food items.3 McDonald's ran extensive advertising
campaigns, representing that all participating customers had a fair and equal
opportunity to win the offered prizes.4
Around April 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began
investigating these games.5 While the promotions were still running, the
FBI informed McDonald's that its game pieces were not being distributed
randomly. 6 Nonetheless, McDonald's continued running the games and
publishing advertisements representing that all consumers had a fair and
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank my
parents for their encouragement throughout this process.





5. Id. at 1160.
6. Id.
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equal chance to win.7 On August 21, 2001, the FBI and U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) announced that the company that McDonald's hired to run
the games criminally diverted "at least $20 million in high-value prizes by
embezzling winning, high-value game pieces."' 8 Subsequently, a Burger
King franchisee brought a federal false advertising action under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. Suing on behalf of himself and approximately
1100 other Burger King franchisees, the franchisee claimed that the
promotional games lured customers from Burger King to McDonald's and
that the advertisements touting high-value prizes were "literally false." 9
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, dismissed
the claim, holding that the class of plaintiffs lacked prudential standing to
bring a false advertising claim against McDonald's. l0  Standing is a
doctrine that determines whether a plaintiff is entitled to have his dispute
decided by a court.11 Article III of the Constitution forms the basis for one
strand of standing requirements, while the other strand-prudential
standing-is composed of judicially self-imposed limits on standing.12 The
issue in the case against McDonald's-standing to bring a federal false
advertising claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 13-has generated
considerable disagreement among the federal circuit courts. Traditionally,
the courts have disagreed whether a plaintiff who is not in competition with
the defendant can satisfy prudential standing limitations in a section 43(a)
false advertising action. 14 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Phoenix of
Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. added a new aspect to the debate by
holding that a direct competitor plaintiff lacked standing. 15
Part I discusses the background and general principles of both Article III
and prudential standing and of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the federal
false advertising statute. This part concludes with an explanation of why
prudential standing limitations apply to section 43(a). Part II provides a
detailed examination of the three different approaches the courts have taken
in determining section 43(a) standing. Part III argues that the five-factor
test used by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits is the best approach. Part III also argues that direct competitor
plaintiffs should not be denied standing under the five-factor test. Instead,




10. Id. at 1161, 1173.
11. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). For a
detailed discussion of the standing doctrine, see infra Part I.A.
12. See, e.g., Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 11. Part I.A.1 of this Note discusses the
constitutional standing requirements. Prudential standing is discussed in Part I.A.2.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000). The Lanham Act is the common name for the
Trademark Act of 1946. See infra text accompanying notes 61-62.
14. Part II examines the disagreements among the approaches in detail.
15. McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1173. For further discussion on this topic, see infra note
306 and accompanying text.
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alleges a sufficient interest and injury to invoke the protection of section
43(a).
I. THE STANDING DOCTRINE AND THE LANHAM ACT
Part I discusses the doctrine of standing and its relation to the Lanham
Act. Part L.A discusses both the constitutional requirements for standing
under Article III and the judicially self-imposed prudential limitations on
standing. Then, Part I.B discusses the history of section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, which creates a federal cause of action for false advertising
claims, and demonstrates its advantages over the common law. Finally,
Part I.C illustrates why courts have uniformly held that prudential standing
limitations apply to section 43(a).
A. The Standing Requirement Generally
In every federal case, the plaintiff must establish that he has standing to
bring the action.16 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the "essence" of
the standing inquiry is "whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues."' 17 To have standing,
a litigant must satisfy both constitutional requirements and prudential
limitations.' 8 Both sets of requirements are "founded in concern about the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."' 9
1. Standing Requirements Derived from Article III of the Constitution
Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the federal courts to
adjudicating actual "cases" and "controversies." 20 In Flast v. Cohen,21 the
Supreme Court stated that taken together, the words "cases" and
"controversies" embody two different limitations on the power of federal
courts. 22 First, they limit federal courts' power to adjudicate matters to
those "presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed
16. See, e.g., Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 11.
17. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see also William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 229 (1988) (framing the "essence" of the standing
question as whether "the plaintiff [has] a legal right to judicial enforcement of an asserted
legal duty"). In section 43(a) false advertising cases, the focus of this Note, courts have
disagreed in their approaches to determining whether a plaintiff has such a right. See
generally infra Part II. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
developed an approach that focuses on the relationship between the parties, while the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, and Third Circuits developed standing tests that look
to the injury suffered by the plaintiff. See generally infra Parts II.A, I1.B, II.C.2. The
standing requirements for section 43(a) false advertising claims are important for potential
plaintiffs due to the emergence of section 43(a) as the preferred vehicle for bringing false
advertising claims. See infra notes 92-111.
18. See, e.g., Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 11.
19. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
20. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
21. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
22. See id. at 94-95.
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as capable of resolution through the judicial process." 23  Second, they
define the role of the judiciary in the federal government's "tripartite
allocation of power" and assure that the judiciary will not intrude into areas
reserved for the executive and legislative branches.24
Consistent with the latter limitation, the Court has stated that Article III
does not give the judiciary "unconditioned authority to determine the
constitutionality of legislative or executive acts."' 25 Instead, its power to
adjudicate individual legal rights and to determine governmental authority
is proper only as a "last resort" and when necessary to "determin[e] [a] real,
earnest and vital controversy." '26 In Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, the Supreme Court
illustrated the separation of powers concerns raised by the exercise of
judicial power, discussing the effect of a federal court fulfilling its "ultimate
and supreme function" of declaring a legislative or executive act
unconstitutional.27  The Court noted that although this function was
approved in Marbury v. Madison28 and is a powerful means of protecting
individual rights, it could also serve as the "ultimate threat" to the
judiciary's effectiveness if exercised without restraint. 29 The Court quoted
Justice Lewis Powell's concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson30
to explain,
[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-
tenured branch and the representative branches of government will not, in
the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence essential to
the former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode if we do not
exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the
actions of the other branches. 31
Thus, the Court concluded that declaring a legislative or executive act
unconstitutional is a "last resort" for the judiciary, to be used only when a
party with sufficient interests questions an act's constitutionality. 32
23. Id. at 95.
24. Id. Justiciability is the term used to express this dual limitation placed on the federal
judiciary by Article III's case or controversy requirement. See id.; see also Fletcher, supra
note 17, at 222 (stating that the standing doctrine ensures that litigants are "truly adverse"
and that the parties most directly concerned with an issue are able to litigate it, and prevents
the federal judiciary from "usurping the policy-making functions of the popularly elected
branches").
25. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454
U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
26. Id. (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345
(1892)).
27. Id. at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry.,
143 U.S. at 345).
28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178-180 (1803).
29. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473-74.
30. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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Standing is one of several Article Ill doctrines that has developed to
define the role of the judiciary in our government. 33 Supreme Court case
law demonstrates that there are three well-established Article III standing
limitations: (1) that the plaintiff suffered an "'injury in fact'-an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is . . .concrete and particularized,
and ... actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; 3 4 (2) that there
is a "causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-
the injury has to be 'fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court"; 35 and (3) that it is "likely" and not "merely
speculative" that a favorable decision will redress the injury.36 In Allen v.
Wright, the Court noted that these requirements lack a definition precise
enough to make Article III standing inquiries "mechanical exercise[s]. ' '37
However, the definitions have been somewhat clarified through case law,
and in many instances standing questions can be determined primarily by
comparing the allegations to those in prior standing cases. 38
Though the Article III case or controversy requirement is founded partly
on separation of powers concerns,39 the Court has not always viewed
Article III standing as a separation of powers doctrine. In Flast v. Cohen,
the Court stated that standing hinges on whether the plaintiff is "a proper
party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the
issue itself is justiciable." 40 According to the Flast Court, the question
whether a plaintiff can properly maintain an action does not present
separation of powers concerns related to the judiciary interfering in areas
reserved for the other governmental branches. 4' Rather, these separation of
powers concerns arise only from the substantive matters the plaintiff seeks
to have adjudicated, which are not relevant to a standing inquiry.42 Thus,
the Court concluded that the standing inquiry relates only to "whether the
dispute . . .will be presented in an adversary context and in a form
33. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). Others include ripeness-"whether
the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention"-and
mootness-"whether the occasion for judicial intervention persists." Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975). The U.S. Supreme Court in Allen stated that standing is "perhaps
the most important of these doctrines." 468 U.S. at 750; see also John C. Yang, Standing...
In the Doorway of Justice, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1356, 1386-87 (1991) (stating that the
standing, mootness, ripeness, finality, and exhaustion doctrines all go to the "larger question
of justiciability").
34. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The "particularized" limitation requires the injury to affect the
plaintiff "in a personal and individual way." Id. at 560 n. 1.
35. Id. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42
(1976)) (alterations and omissions in original).
36. Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
38. See id. at 751-52.
39. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
40. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
41. See id. at 100.
42. See id. at 100-01.
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historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." 43 Sixteen years later,
however, the Court in Allen stated that "the law of Art[icle] III standing is
built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers."' 44 The Court
has since repeated this sentiment. 45
Finally, a plaintiff must support his Article III standing with the same
"manner and degree of evidence" at each stage of the litigation as any other
matter where plaintiffs bear the burden of proof.46 Thus, upon ruling on a
motion to dismiss for lack of standing, both trial and appellate courts must
accept all of the plaintiffs allegations as true, and must construe the
complaint in the plaintiffs favor. 47 Therefore, at this stage "general factual
allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for
on a motion to dismiss we 'presum[e] that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim."' 48 However,
the trial court may allow or require the plaintiff to provide "further
particularized allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiffs
standing." 49  If these particularized facts do not demonstrate adequate
standing, the court must dismiss the claim. 50
2. Prudential Standing Limitations
In addition to the "immutable" Article III standing requirements, federal
courts also adhere to a set of prudential limitations on standing, which are
"'judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction."'' 51
In Warth v. Seldin, the Court stated that the finding of prudential standing
depends essentially on "whether the constitutional or statutory provision on
which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the
plaintiff s position a right to judicial relief."'52 These prudential limitations
have not been "exhaustively defined. '53 It is well established, however,
43. Id. at 101.
44. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)
45. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 752);
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 472 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Allen to
demonstrate that a view of standing based on adverseness has been repudiated). For an
argument that Allen is incorrect in its assertion that standing is a separation of powers
doctrine, see generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v.
Wright, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 635 (1985) (arguing that the proper view of standing is as a
doctrine that focuses on the plaintiffs stake in the outcome of the controversy).
46. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167-68 (1997).
47. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
48. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992)).
49. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
50. See id. at 501-02.
51. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
52. 422 U.S. at 500.
53. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004); see also Yang,
supra note 33, at 1387 (stating that prudential requirements are more "flexible" than their
Article III counterparts and that the Supreme Court has listed only "nonexclusive" prudential
guidelines, which has led to "haphazard" results producing dissension among the circuit
courts).
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that "prudential standing encompasses 'the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication
of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.' ' 54 The Court in
Warth stated that, without these judicially self-imposed limitations, which
relate to Article III concerns, "the courts would be called upon to decide
abstract questions of wide public significance" better suited to other
governmental institutions and not requiring judicial protection of individual
rights. 55
Unlike the constitutional requirements, prudential standing limitations
can be "modified or abrogated by Congress." 56 The prudential limitations,
however, are presumed to apply unless Congress "expressly negate[s]"
them.57 Thus, Congress may grant persons otherwise barred by prudential
standing limitations an express right of action. 58 Because the Article III
requirements remain,59 parties granted such a right and meeting the
constitutional requirements may have standing to obtain relief based on the
legal rights of others or to support their claim by "invok[ing] the general
public interest."'60
B. False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act6' is the common name for the Trademark Act of
1946.62 The purposes of the Lanham Act are set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1127,
and include "making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks
in . . . commerce" and "protect[ing] persons engaged in . . . commerce
against unfair competition." 63
Consistent with this intent, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides for
federal causes of action for false association and false advertising. 64 It
states,
54. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751); see also Yang, supra
note 33, at 1361 (stating that courts frequently address prudential issues with tests that focus
on a third party's ability to assert another's rights or on whether "a particular plaintiff is
within a class Congress intended to protect").
55. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
56. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
57. See id. at 163.
58. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; see also Fletcher, supra note 17, at 251-52 (stating that
the idea behind prudential standing "appears to be that in the exercise of 'prudence,' the
Court may decline to grant standing to a plaintiff, but if Congress explicitly confers standing
on such a plaintiff, then the Court's 'prudential' hesitation is overcome").
59. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
60. Id.
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1129 (2000).
62. See, e.g., KP Pernanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
117(2004).
63. 15U.S.C.§ 1127.
64. See infra notes 66, 68 and accompanying text.
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(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or
another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is or is likely to be damaged by such act.6 5
Section 43(a)(1)(A) provides a cause of action for false association
claims. 66 Such claims require the plaintiff to show that the misuse of its
trademark or other distinguishing feature confused consumers as to the
origin, endorsement, or approval of its product. 67 Section 43(a)(1)(B)
provides a cause of action for false advertising claims. 68 To succeed on
such a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant's
advertisement included a false or misleading statement of fact or
representation; (2) "the misrepresentation is material, in that it is likely to
influence the purchasing decision"; (3) the misrepresentation actually
deceives or at least has the tendency to deceive a substantial portion of its
intended audience; (4) "the defendant placed the false or misleading
statement in interstate commerce"; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely
to be injured as a result, either by a loss of sales or loss of goodwill.69
In addition to bringing false advertising claims under section 43(a),
plaintiffs may also bring common law false advertising claims or claims
under state false advertising statutes.70 Section 43(a) claims, however, are
advantageous for several reasons. 71 False advertising is a component of the
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
66. See 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§
27:9-:10 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that this subsection covers infringement of marks, trade
names, and trade dress); see also Conte Bros. Auto. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d
221, 232 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1998) (referring to such claims as false association claims and this
subsection as the false association prong of section 43(a)).
67. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1109 n.9 (9th Cir. 1992). This
Note focuses on standing under the false advertising prong of section 43(a), not the false
association prong. However, the false association prong is relevant to the Ninth Circuit's
development of its false advertising standing rule. See infra Part II.A.
68. See McCarthy, supra note 66, §§ 27:9-:10 (referring to this subsection as the false
advertising prong of section 43(a)).
69. See, e.g., Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 310-
11 (lst Cir. 2002).
70. See generally McCarthy, supra note 66, §§ 27:1-:5, 27:113-: 116.
71. See infra notes 101 -11 and accompanying text.
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broader law of unfair competition. 72 There is not a widely accepted
theoretical basis for the law of unfair competition, but three bases for
allowing unfair competition actions have been expressed-the promotion of
honest and fair dealing, the protection of consumers, and the protection of
individual businesses' rights and property.73 Prior to the enactment of
section 43(a), however, the unfair competition law developed by courts was
not consistent with these principles. 74
The common law required proof that the defendant's conduct
proximately caused actual loss to the plaintiff for the plaintiff to have
standing to bring a false advertising claim.75 Where the plaintiff was one of
many sellers of a particular product, this burden was extremely difficult to
overcome, as a plaintiff had to demonstrate that "but for" defendant's false
advertising, defendant's customers would have instead bought from the
plaintiff and not one of the other sellers. 76 The common law contained,
however, a single source exception: if, other than the defendant, the
plaintiff was the only source of the product, then demonstrating that
consumers would have purchased from the plaintiff but for the defendant's
false advertisements was not difficult. 77 Otherwise, it was "practically
impossible" for plaintiffs to state an actionable claim. 78
A case illustrative of the above principle is New York & R. Cement Co. v.
Coplay Cement CO.7 9 There, the plaintiff was one of several cement
manufacturers in the town of Rosendale, New York.80  The cement
manufactured in Rosendale was always marketed as "Rosendale Cement."8'
The plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant, who manufactured cement
elsewhere, from continuing to use the word "Rosendale" in describing its
cement, and sought damages resulting from such use. 82 Though it was
conceded that the public understood the name "Rosendale Cement" to refer
to cement manufactured in Rosendale and that the defendant was
untruthfully referring to its cement by that name, the court stated that "the
question still remains whether [the defendant] can be prosecuted therefor, at
the suit of a private party, who is only one of the many who manufacture
cement at Rosendale, and truly denominate their cement 'Rosendale
Cement.' ' 8 3  The court rejected the plaintiffs claim and stated that
72. See I Louis Altman, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies
§ 2.3, at 2-16 to -17 (4th ed. 2007) (stating that recent cases recognize false advertising as
unfair competition); 44 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 1 (1997).
73. 1 Altman, supra note 72, § 1.14, at 1-87 to -88.
74. See id. § 5.2.
75. McCarthy, supra note 66, § 27:1.
76. See id.
77. See id. § 27.4.
78. See id. § 27.1.
79. 44 F. 277 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1890).
80. Id. at 277.
81. Id. at 278.
82. Id. at 277-78.
83. Id. at 278.
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allowing such a claim would "open a Pandora's box of vexatious
litigation." 84
Under the common law, even being the single source of a product was
not always enough for a false advertising plaintiff. In the "landmark
case" 85 of American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co.,86 the sole
manufacturer of aluminum washboards sought to enjoin the defendant-
who manufactured washboards made of zinc-from falsely representing
that its washboards were made of aluminum.87 The court could have
distinguished Coplay through the single source exception,88 but instead
denied plaintiffs request for relief.89 The court stated that the plaintiffs
complaint "loses sight of the thoroughly established principle that the
private right of action in such cases is not based upon fraud or imposition
upon the public, but is maintained solely for the protection of the property
rights of complainant." 90 The court held that, though defendant's conduct
was "doubtless morally wrong," no private action arises unless the
plaintiff's property rights are invaded. 91
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act removes many of these obstacles to
plaintiffs. 92 In enacting the Lanham Act, Congress focused primarily on
creating a new federal trademark statute. 93 Initially, Congress viewed
section 43(a) as a "minor, but useful section" serving as a necessary
replacement for the prior federal statute covering protection of unregistered
84. Id. at 278-79.
85. IA Altman, supra note 72, § 5.2, at 5-9.
86. 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
87. Id. at 283.
88. 1A Altman, supra note 72, § 5.2, at 5-10.
89. Am. Washboard, 103 F. at 287.
90. Id. at 285.
91. Id. Judge Learned Hand, in discussing these cases, explained that "the law does not
allow [the plaintiff] to sue as a vicarious avenger of the defendant's customers." Ely-Norris
Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273
U.S. 132 (1927). This "vicarious avenger prohibition" arises out of the common law view
that false advertising was based on the property rights of the competitor, not on defrauding
consumers. McCarthy, supra note 66, § 27.2.
92. See infra notes 101-11 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that
section 43(a) is not a statute directed at unfair competition generally. McCarthy, supra note
66, § 27:7. For example, it does not apply to business torts such as "'misappropriation,' or
theft of trade secrets." Id. Instead, it is directed at false advertising claims involving a "false
or misleading description or representation of fact, in commercial advertising or promotion,
which misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of goods,
services, or commercial activities." 1A Altman, supra note 72, § 5.5 (footnotes omitted).
93. See Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the
Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 807, 811-12 (1999). There were two primary reasons that
Congress deemed a new trademark statute necessary. First, Congress recognized that
changes in commerce and business rendered the previous federal trademark statutes
inadequate. Id. at 812. Second, with the Supreme Court eliminating federal common law in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Congress was fearful of trademark law
becoming subject to state-by-state interpretation, which it viewed as unacceptable given the
increasingly interstate nature of commerce. See Bums, supra, at 812-13.
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trademarks and trade dress. 94 The view that section 43(a) was of minor
importance remained true in practice for nearly thirty-five years, 95 as
litigants rarely invoked the provision and many courts narrowly interpreted
its language as covering only cases of traditional trademark infringement. 96
However, both litigants and the courts eventually realized that the wording
of section 43(a) did not warrant such a narrow interpretation and that its
language prohibited false advertising, at least in situations where a company
made false statements about its own products. 97 By the 1980s, this view
had gained acceptance and courts began to apply section 43(a) to several
types of false advertising. 98 As a result, section 43(a) became a "much-
used and potent statute" 99 and the "favored legal tool for advertisers...
who felt that a competitor was engaging in false advertising." 100
Unlike the common law, section 43(a) was designed to protect
consumers, in addition to commercial entities, from false advertising. 101 As
a result, section 43(a) provides plaintiffs with several significant advantages
over common law false advertising rules. 10 2 First, section 43(a) eliminates
94. Bums, supra note 93, at 813. The prior statute, section 3 of the 1920 Trademark
Act, was "a little known and seldom used provision" that "required proof of willfulness and
an intent to deceive." J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now
Wide Awake, 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 45, 46-47 (1996). Section 43(a) eliminated these
requirements. Id. at 47. It should be noted that the original version of section 43(a) did not
explicitly refer to false advertising. It stated,
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container . . . for goods, a false designation of origin, or
any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending
falsely to describe or represent the same . . . shall be liable to a civil action by any
person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or the region
in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
McCarthy, supra note 66, § 27:6, at 27-13. Congress amended section 43(a) to its present
form in 1988. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(effective Nov. 16, 1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
95. See Bums, supra note 93, at 816.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 816-17.
98. See McCarthy, supra note 94, at 52.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 56.
101. McCarthy, supra note 66, § 27:25, at 27-47 to -48. Despite this goal, consumers do
not have standing to invoke section 43(a). Id. Instead, consumer rights embodied by section
43(a) "must be invoked by a competitor of the defendant, not by a buyer from the
defendant." Id. at 27-47. Nonetheless, protecting consumers is still viewed as an important
purpose of the statute. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31
(6th Cir. 1987) ("Protecting consumers from false or misleading advertising, moreover, is an
important goal of [section 43(a)] and a laudable public policy to be served."); see also Bums,
supra note 93, at 836-37 (stating that a "vast majority" of courts deny consumer standing,
adhering to the view that competitors are the "ultimate beneficiar[ies]" of the statute and
consumers will be protected by competitors bringing suit). Professor Jean Wegman Bums
goes on to argue that this view is incorrect-that consumer welfare is the "fundamental goal"
of the statute and that a competitor's injury is always derivative of the purchaser's injury.
See id. at 874-75.
102. McCarthy, supra note 66, § 27:25.
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the single source restriction of the common law. 103 Second, section 43(a)
does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate evidence of specific harm to
obtain injunctive relief' 04-a "mere likelihood of deception will suffice."' 105
Therefore, under section 43(a) plaintiffs need not identify specific
individuals that the false or misleading statements reached. Rather,
plaintiffs only need to demonstrate that the statements were "disseminated
sufficiently to the relevant purchasing public."' 106 Another advantage of
section 43(a) over the common law is that under section 43(a) a plaintiff
need not show the extent of his actual damages to obtain an injunction. 10 7
Rather, plaintiffs need only demonstrate a "likelihood of damage."' 1 8 Other
than injunctive relief, remedies available to section 43(a) plaintiffs include
monetary damages, defendant's profits, costs, and, in exceptional cases,
attorneys' fees. 109 Many state false advertising statutes, on the other hand,
limit plaintiffs to injunctive relief.110 Thus, for all of these reasons, "private
false advertising litigation has shifted almost entirely toward § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act."' 1 I
C. Prudential Standing Applies to Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
It is undisputed that the Article III standing requirements apply to section
43(a)." 2 To determine if prudential standing limitations apply to section
43(a), however, it must be determined if Congress intended to abrogate
these limitations in enacting section 43(a). 113 Three circuits have expressly
addressed this question, and all have held that prudential limitations apply
to section 43(a). 114
103. Id. § 27:26, at 27-50 to -52. For a discussion of the single source doctrine, see supra
notes 77-84 and accompanying text. The enactment of section 43(a) created a new federal
statutory tort, sui generis, which is not subject to common law restrictions. McCarthy, supra
note 66, § 27.26, at 27-51. Thus, the only limitation on section 43(a) is its statutory
language, which simply requires the plaintiff to show he is "likely to be damaged" and does
not support the application of the single source restriction. Id. at 27-51 to -52.
104. McCarthy, supra note 66, § 27:28, at 27-53 to -54.
105. IA Altman, supra note 72, § 5.5, at 5-38 (referring to this lowered requirement as
one of the great improvements over the common law).
106. Id. at 5-38 to -39.
107. Id.
108. McCarthy, supra note 66, § 27:31, at 27-57.
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2000).
110. See 44 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 2 (1997); see also McCarthy, supra note 66, §
27:114, at 27-277 to -278 (noting that "[a]bout a dozen" state statutes are based on the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, which does not specifically provide for the recovery
of damages).
111. 1A Altman, supra note 72, § 5.2, at 5-15 to -16.
112. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (stating that the Article III
standing requirements are "immutable"); Conte Bros. Automotive v. Quaker State-Slick 50,
Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that in a section 43(a) false advertising case
Article III standing should be addressed before prudential standing).
113. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
114. See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1162-63 (11 th
Cir. 2007); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 561-62 (5th Cir. 2001);
Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 227.
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In Conte Bros. Automotive v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., the Third
Circuit explained that, in determining whether Congress intended to negate
prudential standing in a given statute, courts look to the statutory text,
structure, and legislative history.' 5 Section 43(a) uses broad language-
allowing "any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged" to bring suit 1'6-that may lead one to conclude that Congress
intended to abrogate prudential standing by allowing "any person" with
Article III standing to bring suit.117 However, the Conte Bros. court
explained that Congress's use of broad language does not necessarily
amount to an express negation of prudential standing by Congress. 118
The Conte Bros. court then looked to two Supreme Court decisions
involving statutes with standing language open to a broad interpretation. In
"the case most directly on point," 19 Associated General Contractors of
California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,120 the Supreme
Court held that prudential standing limitations apply to the Clayton Act,
which gives standing to "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business
or property."' 2' In Bennett v. Spear,122 the statute at issue was the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 123 which states that "any person
may commence a civil suit on his own behalf."' 124 In Bennett, the Court
ultimately held that Congress intended to negate prudential standing
limitations for claims brought under the ESA.' 25 However, the Court
reached its conclusion only after considering the statute's broader
purposes. 126 It stated that its "readiness to take the term 'any person' at
face value [wa]s greatly augmented" by the facts that the statute's subject
matter was the environment-"a matter in which it is common to think all
persons have an interest"-and that the "obvious purpose" of the statutory
provision was to encourage private enforcement. 27 Based on the foregoing
115. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 227. Prudential standing limitations apply unless
expressly negated by Congress. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The other circuits
that have expressly addressed this issue based their conclusions on the Third Circuit's
analysis in Conte Bros., making Conte Bros. the only case necessary to examine. See
McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1162-63 (citing Conte Bros. in holding that prudential standing
limitations apply to the Lanham Act); Procter & Gamble, 242 F.3d at 561-62 (same).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
117. See McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1162.
118. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 227. Congress must expressly negate prudential
standing limitations for the limitations not to apply. See id.
119. Id. at 228.
120. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
121. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
123. Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.).
124. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164 n.2.
125. Id. at 162-66 (stating that the Endangered Species Act of 1973 negated the zone of
interests test, a generally recognized prudential standing doctrine). The zone of interests test
requires the "plaintiff's grievance [to] arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit." Id. at 162.
126. See id. at 165-66.
127. Id.
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cases, the Conte Bros. court concluded that the plain language of section
43(a) did not negate the applicability of prudential standing limitations.128
Further, the court stated that its conclusion did not distort to the plain
meaning of the statute because "Congress intends to incorporate prudential
standing principles unless it expresses its desire to negate them."' 129
The Conte Bros. court then considered the text of section 43(a) to discern
congressional intent. 130 The ESA, at issue in Bennett, allowed "any person
[to] commence a civil suit," and the Supreme Court noted that this was "an
authorization of remarkable breadth when compared with the language
Congress ordinarily uses.' 31  The Third Circuit found this language
broader than the relevant language of section 43(a)-"'any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged"' by the proscribed
conduct. 132 It was "significant" to the court that those entitled to sue under
section 43(a) must be able to "trace their injury to the anti-competitive
conduct proscribed by the Act."' 133 Thus, the court concluded that the
statutory text supported its finding that Congress did not negate prudential
standing in passing section 43(a). 134
Next, the Conte Bros. court found that the structure of the Lanham Act
supported its conclusion that Congress did not intend to remove prudential
standing limitations. 135 The Court looked to section 45 of the Lanham Act,
where Congress specified its intent in passing the Act 136:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of
Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such
commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect
persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent
fraud and deception in such commerce .... 137
The court stated that "[t]his section makes clear that the focus of the statute
is on anti-competitive conduct in a commercial context." 138  The court
therefore reasoned that "[c]onferring standing to the full extent implied by
the text of § 43(a)" would contradict the purpose of the Lanham Act by
giving standing to parties, such as consumers, that did not suffer a
competitive or commercial injury. 139 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded




131. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164-65 (internal quotation marks omitted).





137. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
138. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 229.
139. Id. The court noted that this would also contradict its precedent-and that of other
circuit courts-which holds that consumers lack standing to bring a Lanham Act false
advertising claim. Id.
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that congressional intent in enacting the Lanham Act, "far from indicating
an express intent to abrogate prudential standing doctrine, evidences an
intent to limit standing to a narrow class of potential plaintiffs possessing
interests the protection of which furthers the purposes of the Lanham
Act."'140
Finally, the Conte Bros. court concluded its analysis by examining the
legislative history of the Lanham Act. 141 The court noted that the Senate
reports regarding both the Lanham Act and its 1988 amendments focused
on commercial, anticompetitive conduct. 142 The court also noted that in
enacting the Lanham Act, Congress sought to unify federal trademark law,
which previously was governed by several statutes "scattered throughout
the United States Code."' 143 These earlier statutes "defined the class of
eligible plaintiffs narrowly" and were "drafted against the backdrop of
common law doctrine similar to today's prudential standing doctrine that
limited the eligible plaintiff class." 144 The court found nothing in the
Lanham Act's legislative history to demonstrate an intention to change
significantly the class of plaintiffs entitled to bring suit. 14 5  Thus, the
Lanham Act's legislative history supported the court's conclusion that
Congress did not intend to abrogate prudential standing limitations of
section 43(a) plaintiffs. ' 46
In sum, courts agree that standing limitations beyond those required by
Article III are necessary for section 43(a) false advertising claims.
However, prudential standing limitations have not been precisely
defined, 147 and there is "no single overarching test" to determine standing
under a given statute.148 Thus, courts are free to develop their own standing
tests. This freedom, however, has led to considerable disagreement among
the circuit courts as to what constitutes section 43(a) standing. Part II of
this Note examines the differing standards applied by the circuit courts.
II. THE THREE APPROACHES TO DETERMINING STANDING
FOR SECTION 43(a) FALSE ADVERTISING CLAIMS
This part provides a detailed discussion of the three general approaches
to section 43(a) standing currently adopted by the circuit courts. Part II.A
covers the approach developed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
140. Id. The court further reasoned that the Lanham Act's commercial subject matter and
stated purpose distinguished it from the statute at issue in Bennett, where the environmental
subject matter "readily admitted of a finding" that Congress intended to broaden standing to
its Article III limit. Id.
141. See id. at 229-30.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 229.
144. Id. at 230.
145. See id. at 229.
146. See id. at 230.
147. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
148. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 232.
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Circuit, which requires the allegation of a discernibly competitive injury. 149
Part II.B discusses the approach taken by both the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the First and Second Circuits. These circuits require a plaintiff to
demonstrate a "'reasonable interest to be protected' against the advertiser's
false or misleading claims" and a "causal nexus to the false advertising."'
5 0
Part II.C examines three circuits' use of a five-factor standing test,
originally used to determine federal antitrust standing. 151
A. The Ninth Circuit's Discernibly Competitive Injury Approach
In determining section 43(a) standing, the Ninth Circuit differentiates
between section 43(a)(1)(A) false association claims and section
43(a)(1)(B) false advertising claims. 152 A false association plaintiff need
only allege an injury to a commercial interest caused by the defendant's
misuse of a trademark or wrongful identification of a product. 153 False
advertising standing, however, is limited to competitors of the defendant-
the plaintiff must allege a discernibly competitive injury. 154
The Ninth Circuit clarified this standing rule in Waits v. Frito-Lay,
Inc. 155 The plaintiff, Tom Waits, was a professional singer, songwriter, and
actor, who has a distinctive singing voice. 156 In a commercial for a product
manufactured and sold by one of the defendants, the defendants used a
newly recorded version of one of Waits's songs. 157 The defendants hired a
singer who did a "near-perfect imitation" of Waits.158 After hearing the
commercial, Waits sued for, among other things, false endorsement under
the Lanham Act. 159 The defendants asserted that Waits lacked standing to
bring the Lanham Act claim because he was not in competition with the
defendants. 160
In resolving this issue, the court noted that two previous Ninth Circuit
cases served as conflicting precedent. In Smith v. Montoro, the plaintiff
was an actor who starred in a movie that the defendant was licensed to
149. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1109 (9th Cir. 1992).
150. See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1994)
(quoting PPX Enters. v. Autofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 1984)); Camel Hair
and Cashmere Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 11-12 (1st Cir.
1986) (requiring a "reasonable interest in being protected against false advertising" and a
demonstrated "link or 'nexus' between itself and the alleged falsehood").
151. See, e.g., Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 233.
152. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1109-10.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1109.
155. Id. at 1109-10 (holding that, while false association standing is not limited to
competitors, false advertising plaintiffs must allege a discernibly competitive injury).
156. Id. at 1097-98.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1097.
159. Id. at 1098. False endorsement is a type of claim encompassed by section
43(a)(1)(A), which is the false association subsection of section 43(a). See id. at 1107 & n.7
(reciting and emphasizing the language of this subsection).
160. Id. at 1107.
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distribute. 16 1 The plaintiffs contract allegedly provided that the plaintiff
would receive star billing in both the screen credits and advertisements. 162
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant used another actor's name in both
the credits and advertisements and brought multiple claims against the
defendant, including "false designation or representation" in violation of
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 163 The court analogized the defendant's
conduct to trademark infringement, 164 and found that, like cases of
trademark infringement, the defendant's conduct was "an attempt to
misappropriate or profit from [the plaintiff's] talents and workmanship."' 165
The Smith court then stated that, to have standing under section 43(a), "the
plaintiff . . . need not be in actual competition with the alleged
wrongdoer."' 166 Instead, the "'dispositive"' standing question "is whether
the party 'has a reasonable interest to be protected against false
advertising.""' 167 The court stated that actors have a "vital interest" in
receiving proper credit for their work, and thus held that the plaintiff had
standing to bring a section 43(a) claim. 168
However, in H.B. Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc.,169 the
Ninth Circuit reached an opposite conclusion. The plaintiff in that case
produced a movie that was designed to appeal to a teenage and young adult
audience.' 70 The movie was awarded a PG rating, but the defendant film
distributors advertised the movie as being rated R. 171 The film was a box
office failure, and the plaintiff brought a section 43(a) claim alleging that
this failure resulted from defendants' misrepresentations of the film's
rating. 172 The court noted that the Lanham Act is "directed against unfair
competition."' 173 Therefore, the Halicki court held that, "[tlo be actionable,
[the defendant's] conduct must not only be unfair but must in some
discernible way be competitive."' 174 The court stated that, in cases of false
161. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 603-04 (internal quotation marks omitted). It should be noted that section
43(a) had not been amended to its current form at the time of this case. This claim was
brought under the original section 43(a), which did not have separate provisions
distinguishing false advertising and false association claims. See supra note 94 for the
original text, which created causes of action for "a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation." However, the amendments did not substantively change the
operative standing language. See Conte Bros. Auto. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, 165 F.3d 221,
230 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998).
164. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107 (discussing Smith).
165. Smith, 648 F.2d at 607.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 608 (quoting 1 Rudolf Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition Trademarks
and Monopolies § 18.2(b), at 625 (3d ed. 1967)).
168. Id.
169. 812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987).
170. Id. at 1213.
171. Id.
172. Id. As in Smith, section 43(a) had not been amended to its current form at the time
of this case.




designation, if section 43(a) standing was not confined to "injury to a
competitor," section 43(a) would "become[] a federal statute creating the
tort of misrepresentation," which would "dilut[e] ... the concept of unfair
competition."' 175 Thus, because the plaintiff and the defendant were not
competitors, the court held that the plaintiff did not state an actionable
section 43(a) claim.176
The Waits court, however, reconciled this apparent conflict. It started by
noting that "the basic principle" embodied by both cases is that section
43(a) standing exists where the plaintiff asserts a commercial interest
protected by the Lanham Act.177 The court then noted that two purposes of
the Lanham Act are "to make 'actionable the deceptive and misleading use
of marks in . . . commerce' and 'to protect persons engaged in...
commerce against unfair competition." ' 178  The court stated that, by
providing bases of liability for both false association and false advertising,
section 43(a) reflects both purposes.179
The Waits court followed this reasoning and distinguished the two
conflicting cases, stating that the claim in Halicki was "exclusively" a "false
advertising" claim, as it sought to redress "a simple misrepresentation as to
a product's quality" and the "use of trademarks were irrelevant to [the
plaintiffs] claim."'180 Such a claim, according to the court, is "not related
to the Lanham Act's purpose of preventing the 'deceptive and misleading
use of marks." ' 181  Thus, the court concluded that, "where the
misrepresentation simply concerns a product's qualities," it is only
actionable to serve "the Lanham Act's other purpose of preventing 'unfair
competition,"' and that, "[i]n such cases, Halicki counsels that a discernibly
competitive injury must be alleged."' 82
Smith, on the other hand, involved "a false association claim stemming
from the misuse of a mark, for it alleged the wrongful removal of the
plaintiffs name and the wrongful substitution of another's name.' 1 83
Because such a claim reflects the Lanham Act's purpose of preventing the
"deceptive and misleading use of marks," serving the "unfair competition"
purpose is unnecessary. 184 Therefore, the Waits court held that standing to
bring false association claims is not limited to competitors. 185 The alleged
injury must still be commercial, however. 186 Thus, the court stated that
those with standing to bring a false association claim "include parties with a
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992).
178. Id. (omissions in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1109 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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commercial interest in the product wrongfully identified with another's
mark, as in Smith, or with a commercial interest in the misused mark."'
1 87
As just explained, the Ninth Circuit's approach to section 43(a) standing
differentiates between false association and false advertising claims. A
party bringing a false advertising action must be a competitor of the
defendant, 188 while a false association plaintiff need not be-all that is
required is an allegation of a commercial injury. 189 Thus, in Waits, the
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had standing to bring a claim under
section 43(a). 190 The plaintiff's claim of false endorsement-based on the
misuse of his identity as a celebrity-was a type of false association claim,
rendering the noncompetitive relationship of the parties irrelevant for
standing purposes. 191 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits have since adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach.
192
However, other courts and commentators have been critical of the Ninth
Circuit's standing rule.
Both cases and commentaries have criticized the Ninth Circuit's
approach for distinguishing between the two types of section 43(a) claims
and for requiring false advertising plaintiffs to be in competition with the
defendant. Professor J. Thomas McCarthy describes Halicki-the case that
first required the plaintiff to be in competition with the defendant' 93-as an
"aberration in the history of court interpretation of § 43(a)."'194 McCarthy
rejects the Ninth Circuit's rule requiring a discernibly competitive injury,
stating that "[t]he pass6 semantic argument that there cannot be 'unfair
competition' without 'competition' between the parties has often been
rejected."' 195 The Third Circuit explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's
187. Id. The court noted that competition between the parties is not completely
irrelevant. Though it does not affect the standing inquiry, competition is relevant to the
court's analysis of the claim's merits. See id. at 1109 n.9.
188. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
190. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110.
191. Id.
192. See Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1109) (stating that, "to have standing for a false advertising claim, the
plaintiff must be a competitor of the defendant and allege a competitive injury"); L.S. Heath
& Son, Inc. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 575 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Waits, 978 F.2d
at 1109) (requiring that a false advertising plaintiff "assert a discernible competitive injury").
193. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
194. McCarthy, supra note 66, § 27:32, at 27-67. J. Thomas McCarthy notes that the
Ninth Circuit "candidly admit[ted]" that Halicki was inconsistent with circuit precedent,
which allowed noncompetitor plaintiffs to bring false representation claims in factually
similar situations. Id.
195. Id.; see also James S. Wrona, False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Broad Consumer Protection Legislation or a Narrow Pro-
Competitive Measure?, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 1085, 1136-38 (1995) (stating that the dichotomy
in the Ninth Circuit's approach is "hard to justify" and that Smith's reasonable interest test
should govern under both prongs of section 43(a)). Wrona notes that although the Ninth
Circuit in Waits cited McCarthy in support of its position, McCarthy favors treating both
prongs of section 43(a) the same for procedural matters such as standing. Id. at 1136. The
court in Guarino v. Sun Co., 819 F. Supp. 405, 408-09 (D.N.J. 1993), also noted that
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approach in Conte Bros. 196 The court stated that the text of section 43(a)
provided no support for distinguishing between the two types of claims
because the operative standing language was the same for both prongs of
the statute. 19 7 In sum, cases and commentaries have criticized the two
defining aspects of Waits's holding-that the two subsections of section
43(a) warrant different standing rules, and that a false advertising plaintiff
must be a competitor of the defendant.
B. The First and Second Circuits' Reasonable Interest Approach
The First and Second Circuits take nearly identical approaches to section
43(a) standing. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, these circuits do not draw a
distinction between the two prongs of section 43(a), nor do they require
competition between the parties. Instead, these circuits focus on the nature
of the plaintiffs allegedly harmed interest and on the causal connection
between the plaintiff's interest and the defendant's false advertising.
1. The First Circuit
In Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., the First Circuit addressed
a section 43(a) false designation and description claim. 19 8 The claim
alleged that the defendant improperly used the plaintiffs trademarked label
on its products. 199 The court stated that the "basis for an action under
[section 43(a)] is use of a mark in interstate commerce which is likely to
cause confusion or to deceive purchasers concerning the source of the
goods."200 The First Circuit then held that parties have standing to sue
under section 43(a) if they "may suffer adverse consequences" as a result of
a violation of the statute, "regardless of whether [they are] the registrant of
a trademark."'20 1 In support of this conclusion, the court cited Rudolf
Callmann's treatise on unfair competition for the proposition that the
"'dispositive question' is whether plaintiff 'has a reasonable interest to be
protected against false advertising. "'202 The court then concluded that the
plaintiff "showed a sufficient nexus between itself and the alleged conduct
of [the defendant] to confer standing to sue." 20 3
The First Circuit clarified this holding in Camel Hair & Cashmere
Institute of America, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp.20 4 There, the
McCarthy "states flatly" that the same standing criteria should apply to both prongs of
section 43(a).
196. 165 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998).
197. Id. at 232; see also infra text accompanying notes 249-50.
198. Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1977). Like
Smith and Halicki, the claim in this case was brought under the prior version of section
43(a). See supra note 94 for the text of this version of the statute.
199. Id. at 157.
200. Id. at 160.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting 1 Callmann, supra note 167, § 18.2(b), at 625).
203. Id.
204. 799 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986).
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plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation whose goal was to promote and protect
the interests of the cashmere and camel hair industry.205 Plaintiff alleged
that defendants sold and marketed cashmere coats that had substantially less
cashmere than was indicated on their labels.20 6 Although this case involved
marketing of falsely advertised products and Quabaug involved the
improper use of a trademark, section 43(a) had yet to be amended and thus
did not recognize these as two separate causes of action. 20 7 Therefore, the
Camel Hair court followed Quabaug and stated that "the dispositive
question in determining whether a plaintiff is a proper person to bring a
claim under the Lanham Act, is whether the plaintiff has a reasonable
interest in being protected against false advertising."208 The court noted
that this standard does not require the plaintiff to be a competitor of the
defendant. 20 9  However, the court stated that the reasonable interest
requirement "does not mean that it is sufficient for the plaintiff merely to
establish a falsehood in the defendant's advertising or marketing; the
plaintiff must also show a link or 'nexus' between itself and the alleged
falsehood." 210
Applying this rule, the Camel Hair court held that, although the
plaintiff's members21' did not compete with the defendant, their position as
manufacturers and marketers of cashmere gave them a "strong interest in
preserving cashmere's reputation as a high quality fibre." 212  The court
found this a "sufficient nexus to the alleged wrong" to provide the
plaintiffs members standing to sue.213 Camel Hair represents the current
state of First Circuit law on this issue. Thus, in the First Circuit, standing
depends not on the relationship between the parties-as in the Ninth
Circuit-but on the interest the plaintiff is seeking to protect and the
connection between that interest and the false advertising.
2. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's approach to section 43(a) standing is similar to the
First Circuit's approach. To have standing to bring a section 43(a) false
advertising claim in the Second Circuit, a plaintiff "must demonstrate a
reasonable interest to be protected against the advertiser's false or
misleading claims, and a reasonable basis for believing that this interest is
205. Id. at 7.
206. Id. at 7-8.
207. See supra note 198.
208. Camel Hair, 799 F.2d at 11.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 11-12.
211. Although the plaintiff was the nonprofit corporation, the Lanham Act standing issue
arose in the context of the ability of the plaintiff corporation's individual members-all
cashmere or camel hair marketers or manufacturers-to sue in their own right. See id. at 7,
11.
212. Id. at 12.
213. Id.
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likely to be damaged by the false or misleading advertising." 214  The
reasonable interest prong "includes commercial interests, direct pecuniary
interests, and even a future potential for a commercial or competitive
injury. ' 215 The reasonable basis prong requires the plaintiff to show "both
likely injury and a causal nexus to the false advertising." 216 The Second
Circuit's approach to the injury and causation requirements is a flexible
one.217 A plaintiff is not required to be in direct competition with the
defendant and does not have to demonstrate "definite[] lost sales because of
the defendant's advertisements." 218 However, a plaintiff "must show more
than a 'subjective belief that it will be damaged. ' 219 In addition, "'[t]he
likelihood of injury and causation will not be presumed, but must be
demonstrated in some manner."' 220
The factual circumstances of a particular case play an important role in
determining the "type and quantity of proof' needed to show injury and
causation. 221  In general, the Second Circuit has required a "more
substantial showing" where the parties' products do not compete or where
the defendant's advertisements do not directly compare the products.222
Thus, in McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp., the court held
that the district court did not err in presuming harm where the defendant's
advertisement made "[a] misleading comparison to [plaintiffs] specific
competing product." 223  Meanwhile, in Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-
Wallace, Inc., the court required the plaintiff to make a showing of injury
and causation where the parties were indirect competitors and the
defendant's commercial did not compare the parties' products. 224
214. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
215. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 169 (2d Cir. 2007).




220. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690
F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1982)).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1988).
224. Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1980). The
court considered the parties indirect competitors because the plaintiffs baby oil and lotion-
which could be used as shaving cream substitutes and as moisturizers after shaving or use of
depilatories-and defendant's depilatory product competed in the "broad[] hair removal
market," but they did not directly compete in the "narrower depilatory market." Id. Though
a showing of injury and causation was required, the court did not require the plaintiff to
show "specific evidence that [the defendant's] ads actually resulted in some definite loss of
sales." Id. The court stated that the proper standard "is whether it is likely that [the
defendant]'s advertising has caused or will cause a loss of [the plaintiffs] sales." Id. Thus,
the plaintiffs showing of actual loss of sales combined with witness testimony and
consumer surveys indicating that consumers thought they would not need to use the
plaintiff's product if they used the defendant's product-even though the two products were
in reality designed to serve different purposes-was sufficient. See id. at 190-91; see also
Coca-Cola, 690 F.2d at 316 n.2 ("[I]n Johnson & Johnson the element of competition had to
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C. The Five-Factor Standing Test Used by
the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits
In addition to the approaches discussed above, three circuits determine
section 43(a) false advertising standing through use of a five-factor test.225
Though the Third Circuit was the first to employ this test in the context of
section 43(a) false advertising, the test was first developed by the Supreme
Court to determine standing under federal antitrust law. 226 Part II.C. 1
outlines the origins of this test in the antitrust context. Part II.C.2 discusses
Conte Bros., where the Third Circuit became the first court to employ the
test in a section 43(a) case. Part II.C.3 briefly covers the Fifth Circuit's
adoption of the test. Part II.C.4 examines McDonald's, where the Eleventh
Circuit added to the section 43(a) standing debate by using the five-factor
test to deny standing to a direct competitor.
1. The Development of the Five-Factor Standing Test
for Use in Federal Antitrust Law
The Supreme Court case Associated General arose out of a dispute over a
multiemployer collective bargaining agreement.227 The issue facing the
Court was whether the plaintiffs alleged a sufficient injury under the federal
antitrust laws to recover treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.228 Section 4 defines the class of plaintiffs who may bring a private
action for damages under the antitrust laws and provides for the recovery of
treble damages. 229 Its relevant standing language is as follows: "[A]ny
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States. . . ."230 After attempting to discern the
congressional intent behind section 4 by scrutinizing its legislative
history,23 1 the Court set forth a list of factors for courts to analyze when
determining if a given plaintiff is in the class defined by section 4232: (1)
whether the nature of the plaintiffs alleged injury is "of a type that
Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of
be proven because the two products.., were not obviously competing for the same
consumer dollars.").
225. See infra Part II.C.2-4.
226. See infra Part II.C. 1.
227. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 520
(1983).
228. Id. at 521.
229. Id. at 529; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
231. See Associated Gen., 459 U.S. at 529-35. The Court noted that, read literally, the
statute was broad enough to cover any harm directly or indirectly attributable to an antitrust
violation. Id. at 529. The Court sought to determine whether Congress intended such a broad
interpretation. Id. at 530. The Court concluded, "It is plain... that the question whether the
[plaintiff] may recover... cannot be answered simply by reference to the broad language of
§ 4. Instead ... the question requires us to evaluate the plaintiffs harm, the alleged
wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship between them." Id. at 535.
232. See id. at 536 n.33.
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the antitrust laws," 233 (2) "the directness or indirectness of the asserted
injury,' 234 (3) the remoteness of the plaintiff to the injurious antitrust
violation, 235 (4) whether the damages claim is speculative, 236 and (5) the
risk of duplicate recoveries or the complex apportionment of damages.237
2. The Third Circuit Adopts the Associated General Test
for Section 43(a) Standing
In Conte Bros., the plaintiffs were a class of retailers that sold products
that competed with the defendant's product.238 The question facing the
Third Circuit was whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring a section
43(a) false advertising claim.239 After finding that plaintiffs had Article III
standing, 240 the court went through a detailed analysis of section 43(a) and
determined that prudential standing limitations applied to section 43(a). 24 1
The district court in Conte Bros. held that a plaintiff must either be in
direct competition with the defendant or acting as a surrogate of a direct
competitor to have standing. 242 The district court found that the plaintiffs
were not in a competitive relationship with the defendant and dismissed the
claim.243 The Third Circuit stated that this holding was "in some tension"
with its precedent. 244 In Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., the Third Circuit held
that the "dispositive question" in determining section 43(a) standing was
"whether the party has a reasonable interest to be protected against false
advertising." 245  The Third Circuit noted that its subsequent decisions
maintained the reasonable interest requirement and "grappled with defining
the term with greater precision." 246 In one such case, the Third Circuit
233. Id. at 538.
234. Id. at 540. In examining this factor, the Court looked to the causal chain between the
alleged injury and alleged antitrust violation. Id.
235. Id. at 541-42. The Court stated that "[t]he existence of an identifiable class of
persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in
antitrust enforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party... to
perform the office of a private attorney general." Id. at 542.
236. Id. at 542. The Court noted that in past cases it had stated that "it is appropriate for §
4 purposes 'to consider whether a claim rests at bottom on some abstract conception or
speculative measure of harm."' Id. at 543 (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457
U.S. 465, 475 n.1 1(1982)).
237. Id. at 543-44. The Court noted that prior cases identified the "strong interest.., in
keeping the scope of complex antitrust trials within judicially manageable limits." Id. at 543.
The Court also stated that "massive and complex damages litigation not only burdens the
courts, but also undermines the effectiveness of treble-damages suits." Id. at 545.
238. Conte Bros. Auto. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 223 (3d Cir. 1998).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 225.
241. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 227-30; see also supra Part I.C (discussing this holding
in detail).
242. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 224.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 231.
245. Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 933 (3d Cir. 1984) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
246. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 231.
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attempted to clarify its reasonable interest requirement by quoting
Callmann's treatise: "Indeed, the statute goes further in recognizing that the
plaintiff need not even be 'in . . . competition with defendant'; it will be
sufficient .. that [the plaintiff] believes he is or is likely to be damaged,
because, for instance, the parties are doing business on different economic
levels." 247  As this language conflicted with the district court's holding
requiring competition, the Conte Bros. court sought to determine the proper
test for section 43(a) false advertising standing.248
The Third Circuit began its analysis with a discussion of the Ninth
Circuit's "dichotomous" approach.249 The Third Circuit found that section
43(a)'s "operative" standing language-"any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged"-did not provide support for
distinguishing between false advertising and false association claims. 250
Further, it noted that subsequent cases and commentaries criticized the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning. 251 In short, the Third Circuit rejected the Ninth
Circuit's approach. 252
The Conte Bros. court then adopted the Supreme Court's antitrust
standing test-developed in Associated General-as the test for
determining statutory standing under section 43(a), finding it "an
appropriate method for adding content to our 'reasonable interest' test."253
The court also recognized that applying the Associated General test to
section 43(a) had the support of "two prominent commentators in the
area. '"254 The Third Circuit stated the factors as follows:
(1) The nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury: Is the injury "of a type that
Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of
the antitrust laws"? (2) The directness or indirectness of the asserted
injury. (3) The proximity or remoteness of the party to the alleged
247. Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., II F.3d 1163, 1176-77 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting I
Callmann, supra note 167, § 18.2(b), at 625 (footnote omitted)).
248. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 231.
249. See id. at 232. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's approach, see supra Part II.A.
250. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 232.
251. Id. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criticisms
of the Ninth Circuit's approach.
252. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 232-33.
253. Id. at 233.
254. Id. The "two prominent commenta[ries]" the court referred to were McCarthy's
treatise on trademarks and unfair competition and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition. Id. "'In the author's opinion, some limit on the § 43(a) standing of persons
remote from the directly impacted party should be applied by analogy to antitrust law, such
as use of the criteria listed in Associated General ... ' Id. (quoting 4 J. Thomas McCarthy,
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:32 n.1 (4th ed. 1996)). "'In
determining whether an asserted injury is sufficiently direct to justify the imposition of
liability, the Supreme Court's analysis of similar issues under federal antitrust law may offer
a useful analogy."' Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 3 cmt. f,
reporter's note (1995)).
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injurious conduct. (4) The speculativeness of the damages claim. (5) The
risk of duplicative damages or complexity in apportioning damages.
25 5
Applying this test, Conte Bros. held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
256
For the first factor, the court reasoned that, although there may be situations
in which a noncompetitor has standing to sue, "the focus of the Lanham Act
is on commercial interests [that] have been harmed ... and in secur[ing] to
the business community the advantages of reputation and good will. 2
57
While the plaintiffs raised a commercial interest, they did not allege either a
competitive harm or harm to their goodwill or reputation. 2 58 Thus, the
alleged harm was "not of the 'type that Congress sought to redress' by
enacting the Lanham Act."' 259 The court also ruled that the plaintiffs'
remoteness to the harmful conduct weighed against standing because a class
of persons existed-manufacturers of the products that compete with the
defendant's product-that were more directly harmed.260 Further, the court
found that the damages suffered by the plaintiffs were, if not speculative,
avoidable. 26 1 The plaintiffs were retailers, and there was no indication that
they could not sell defendant's product, which would have eliminated any
damages. 2 62 Finally, the court stated that there was a risk of duplicative
damages, as giving a cause of action to every retailer would subject
defendants to multiple liability for the same conduct and allow "an
enormous number of relatively insignificant cases [to be] litigated in the
federal courts." 26 3
255. Id. at 233 (citations omitted) (quoting Associated General, 459 U.S. at 538, 540,
542, 543-44). In the context of section 43(a), the relevant inquiry in the first factor is
whether the injury is one that Congress sought to redress for violations of the Lanham Act,
not the antitrust laws.
256. Id. at 234.
257. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting Associated General, 459 U.S. at 538).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 235.
262. Id.
263. Id. Note that the analysis under the Associated General test is similar in many
respects to the analysis under the First and Second Circuits' reasonable interest approach.
Similar inquiries are made when trying to establish a reasonable interest and a reasonable
basis as when considering the nature and directness of the injury under the Associated
General test. See, e.g., Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156,
1169-70 (11 th Cir. 2007) (determining the directness factor by analyzing plaintiff's alleged
causal chain); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that the reasonable basis prong requires plaintiff to show a causal nexus to the false
advertising); Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799
F.2d 6, 11 (1 st Cir. 1986) (requiring a plaintiff to "show a link or 'nexus' between itself and
the alleged falsehood" to establish a reasonable interest). The Associated General test
requires that the alleged injury harm either a commercial interest or the goodwill and
reputation of the plaintiff. See McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1167-69. Courts applying the
reasonable interest test have also recognized these injuries as the types that provide a
plaintiff with a reasonable interest. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 169 (2d
Cir. 2007) (explaining that reasonable interests in the Second Circuit include "commercial
interests, direct pecuniary interests, and even a future potential for a commercial or
competitive injury"); Camel Hair, 799 F.2d at 12 (holding that plaintiff's interest in
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There has been a favorable reaction to the Third Circuit's decision to
employ the Associated General test. Both the Fifth264 and Eleventh 265
Circuits have subsequently adopted the test, and commentators have
supported its use. 266
3. The Fifth Circuit Follows Conte Bros. and Adopts
the Associated General Test
The Fifth Circuit followed Conte Bros. 's reasoning in Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Amway Corp.267 and adopted the Associated General test for section
maintaining the reputation of cashmere is a sufficient reasonable interest); see also supra
text accompanying note 215. Courts applying the reasonable interest test have also
considered the speculativeness of the damages factor of the Associated General test. See,
e.g., Ortho Pharm., 32 F.3d at 694-97 (explaining that the reasonable basis prong requires
the plaintiff to demonstrate likely injury and denying standing because plaintiff did not offer
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it lost sales due to defendant's advertising). This is
similar to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in McDonald's,
where the damages factor weighed against standing because the plaintiff did not demonstrate
that an "ascertainable percentage" of its lost sales were "directly attributable" to defendant's
advertisements. See McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1171; infra note 291 and accompanying text.
264. See infra Part II.C.3.
265. See infra Part II.C.4.
266. See Thomas L. Casagrande, Recent Developments in Trademark Law, 7 Tex. Intell.
Prop. L.J. 463, 489 (1999) (stating that the Third Circuit's adoption of the five-factor
standing test was sound); Kevin M. Lemley, Resolving the Circuit Split on Standing in False
Advertising Claims and Incorporation of Prudential Standing in State Deceptive Trade
Practices Law: The Quest for Optimal Levels of Accurate Information in the Marketplace,
29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 283, 314 (2007) (arguing that courts should adopt the test as
articulated in Conte Bros.). Professor Lemley writes that false advertising "in its purest
form" is supplying the market with misinformation in an attempt to "misinform, influence,
and persuade consumers .... " Id. at 289. In his view, the market contains optimal
competitive conditions when some, but not all, of the misinformation is corrected. See id. at
310. He argues that "overenforcement" of section 43(a)-allowing it to eliminate all
misinformation from the market-would have significant anticompetitive effects, with the
end result being the total amount of information in the market dropping below optimal
levels. See id. at 289-90. Thus, Lemley states that prudential standing limitations on section
43(a) are necessary to make actionable only those claims that help the market maintain
optimal levels of accurate information. Id. at 311. Specifically, these limitations should
address whether the defendant's conduct has caused the accuracy of information in the
market to drop to an unacceptable level, and if so, what parties should be entitled to take
corrective action and what the corrections should be. Id. Lemley argues that the Associated
General test-which he refers to as the reasonable interest test-"strikes the appropriate
balance between securing accurate information in the market and prohibiting anticompetitive
conduct through overenforcement of section 43(a)." Id. at 3 10. In addition, he writes that the
Associated General test serves the "ultimate purpose of section 43(a)" and constructs the
proper policy framework "without narrowing false advertising," as it "seeks to grant
standing when it would foster procompetitive behavior and to deny standing when it would
foster anticompetitive behavior." Id. at 306. Further, the test "defined and provided the legal
framework of the 'reasonable interest,"' which the Third Circuit's prior test failed to do. Id.
at 300, 302. Lemley does, however, propose a "slight modification" to the directness of the
injury factor. Id. at 314. Lemley would have courts consider whether the defendant's market
is an information-distressed market-one that is based on and readily accepts
misinformation. See id. In such cases, Lemley believes that indirect competitor standing is
"desirable" since direct competitors will not remedy the misinformation. See id.
267. Procter& Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 560-63 (5th Cir. 2001).
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43(a) standing. The complaint in Procter & Gamble alleged that the
defendant made "fraudulent misrepresentations ... to potential employees
to convince them to work for and buy from [the defendant]. '268 Though the
plaintiff and defendant companies had competing products, the plaintiff did
not allege a competitive injury; the defendant did not make false statements
about its products or the plaintiffs products, and there were no allegations
of loss of goodwill or reputation. 269 The court found that each of the five
factors weighed against standing. 270
4. The Eleventh Circuit Adopts the Associated General Test
and Denies Standing to a Direct Competitor
The Eleventh Circuit recently added to the disagreement over section
43(a) standing in McDonald's by holding that a direct competitor plaintiff
failed to satisfy the Associated General test. 271 The section 43(a) false
advertising claim in that case derived from a McDonald's advertising
campaign for several of its promotional games, such as "Monopoly Games
at McDonald's." 272  These advertisements represented that all customers
had an equal chance of winning the offered prizes and also stated the
"specific odds of winning certain prizes, including the high-value
prizes." 273 At least $20 million of these high-value prizes were criminally
"diverted" from the general public by the marketing company responsible
for running the games. 274 Before this fraud was exposed, the FBI informed
McDonald's that its prizes were not being distributed randomly. 275
McDonald's, however, continued to run the same advertisements for the
games. 276 The uncovering of the fraud led to multiple arrests, and in
announcing them the U.S. attorney general stated that the "fraud scheme
denied McDonald's customers a fair and equal chance of winning. '277
268. Id. at 563.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 563-64.
271. Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1173 (11 th Cir.
2007). Note that the McDonald's court refers to what this Note calls the Associated General
test as the Conte Bros. test.
272. Id. at 1159. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
games and prizes.
273. McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1159-60. The high-value prizes included automobiles and
cash awards of up to $1 million. Id. at 1159.
274. Id. at 1160. The company accomplished this by "embezzling winning, high-value
game pieces and distributing them to a network of 'winners' who claimed ... the prizes." Id
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. In all, approximately fifty people "either pleaded guilty or were convicted in
connection with the conspiracy." Id. After the disclosure of this conspiracy, consumers
brought multiple class actions against McDonald's." Id. McDonald's settled the claims by,
among other things, implementing an "Instant Giveaway" of fifteen $1 million prizes to the
general public. Id. McDonald's stated that in total it awarded $25 million in make-up prizes.
See Eric Herman, Burger King Franchisees Sue McDonald's over Monopoly, Chi. Sun-
Times, Aug. 24, 2005, at 76.
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The plaintiff, a Burger King franchisee, subsequently brought a section
43(a) false advertising claim on behalf of himself and approximately 1100
other Burger King franchisees. 278  The plaintiff claimed that the
promotional games "lured customers" from Burger King to McDonald's-
leading to an "'unnatural' spike" in McDonald's profits, and that the games
were "rigged"-specifically that the high-value prizes were diverted from
customers, rendering the "advertising campaigns that touted million dollar
prizes.., literally false." 279 McDonald's moved to dismiss on the ground
that the plaintiff lacked prudential standing under the Lanham Act.280
Applying the Associated General test, the district court dismissed, and the
plaintiff appealed. 281
This was an issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.282 The
court began its analysis by concluding that the plaintiff satisfied the Article
III standing requirements 283 and that prudential standing limitations applied
to section 43(a). 284 In determining the proper prudential standing test for a
section 43(a) false advertising claim, the court followed the Third and Fifth
Circuits and adopted the Associated General five-factor test.285
Applying the factors, the court found that the plaintiff alleged the type of
injury the Lanham Act was intended to redress, as the plaintiff asserted that
its "'commercial interests ... ha[d] been harmed by a competitor's false
advertising."' 286 As for the directness of the injury, the court found that,
although the "causal chain [the plaintiff] alleges is similar to that of the
typical false advertising claim" where a plaintiff alleges lost sales as a result
of the defendant's false or misleading statements about its own product, the
plaintiffs particular causal chain was too "attenuated" to weigh in favor of
standing. 287 The court found this causal chain to be tenuous because the
only prizes affected by the false advertisements were "'rare' high-value
prizes." 288 Thus, the injury would result from customers who would have
eaten at Burger King but were lured to McDonald's specifically because of
the misrepresentations made about the "rare" high-value prizes.289
The third factor weighed in favor of standing, as the court found that
there was no potential plaintiff class more proximate to the alleged injury
than the class of Burger King franchisees that brought the action. 290 The
278. McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1160.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1161.
282. Id. at 1163.
283. Id. at 1161-62.
284. Id. at 1162-63.
285. Id. at 1163.
286. Id. at 1168-69 (quoting Conte Bros. Auto. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d
221, 234 (3d Cir. 1998)).
287. Id. at 1169.
288. See id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1171. McDonald's argued that its customers constituted such a class, but the
court rejected this argument because consumers do not have Lanham Act standing. Id. at
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court then stated that finding the fourth factor to favor standing would
require a "conclu[sion] that an ascertainable percentage of both the increase
in McDonald's sales and the concomitant decrease in Burger King's
sales ... is directly attributable to McDonald's alleged misrepresentations
about the chances of winning high-value prizes," and the court held that the
plaintiffs alleged damages were too speculative to reach this conclusion.291
Finally, the court found that giving this plaintiff class standing would create
a risk of duplicative damages, as "then every fast food competitor of
McDonald's asserting that its sales had fallen by any amount during the
relevant time period would also have prudential standing to bring such a
claim," which would "substantial ly]" impact the federal courts. 292
In the final analysis, two factors favored standing and three weighed
against it, and the court held that the plaintiff lacked prudential standing.293
In reaching its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit rejected an argument by the
plaintiff that "'direct competitors' alleging a 'competitive' injury
'invariably satisfy' the Associated General requirements." 294  The court
1170. The court stated that, under this factor, the inquiry is "whether other commercial
entities were the more appropriate parties to vindicate the competitive harm wrought by the
defendant's alleged misconduct." Id.
291. Id. at 1171 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff argued that at the pleading stage the
focus should be on the allegations, and not on whether the plaintiff could "prove the exact
number of customers lured to McDonald's." Id. See also supra notes 46-50 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the pleading stage. The court rejected this argument,
stating that "to 'presume' that [the plaintiff's] allegations 'embrace those specific facts that
are necessary to support' its claim to an appropriate share of McDonald's profits from the
compromised games requires too much conjecture." McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1171 (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
292. McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1172. Note that the analysis under this factor relates to the
common law single source doctrine. The common law required proof of actual loss of sales.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Thus, under the single source doctrine, unless the
plaintiff and defendant were the only sources of the product subject to false advertising, it
was nearly impossible for a plaintiff to state an actionable claim. See supra notes 75-78 and
accompanying text. Similarly, the McDonald's court held that this factor weighed against
standing because of the presence of additional competitors of McDonald's. See McDonald's,
489 F.3d at 1172-73. Additionally, this factor of the Associated General test will weigh in
favor of standing when the plaintiff and defendant are the only two sources of the product, as
there will be no risk of duplicative damages or difficulties in apportioning the damages.
Though this Associated General factor is grounded in judicial economy, not proof of
causation, the presence of additional potential plaintiffs appears to affect its outcome much
the same as under the common law. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
293. See McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1173. It should be noted that the court would not have
required all five factors to be satisfied for the plaintiff to have standing; it decided the case
"on balance" of the five factors. Id. On the other hand, a plaintiff must meet each
requirement of the reasonable interest test to have standing. See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v.
Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1994) (requiring plaintiffs to show both a
"reasonable interest to be protected" from the false advertising and a "reasonable basis for
believing that this interest is likely to be damaged," which requires showing "both likely
injury and a causal nexus to the false advertising" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
294. McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1167. The plaintiff argued that Conte Bros. adopted the
five-factor test to extend prudential standing to parties not in "actual" or "direct"
competition. Id. at 1164. According to the plaintiff, the five factors "inevitably collapse"
into the Ninth Circuit's approach when a "direct competitor" alleges a "competitive injury,"
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stated that the five-factor test, rather than give standing simply because the
plaintiff alleges he is a "competitor" with a "competitive injury," is
designed to determine "whether the injury alleged is the type of injury that
the Lanham Act was designed to redress-harm to the plaintiffs 'ability to
compete"' and damage to the plaintiffs "'good will and reputation.' 295
In support of this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit stated that a federal
district court-besides the McDonald's district court-had previously
denied standing to a "direct competitor[]" plaintiff under the five-factor
test.296 In that case, KIS, S.A. v. Foto Fantasy, Inc., the plaintiff and the
defendant were both photo booth manufacturers. 297 The plaintiff asserted
claims under section 43(a) for both misrepresentation and false
endorsement. 298 The plaintiff based its misrepresentation claim on the
defendant's advertisements, which allegedly claimed that defendant's photo
booths were the only ones legitimately usable in Europe because of a
patent.299 For the false endorsement claim, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant used Tom Cruise's image to market its photo booths, even
though the defendant did not own the right to use Tom Cruise's likeness.300
The court held that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second, fourth, and fifth
factors of the Associated General test and lacked prudential standing. 30 1
Prior to trial, however, the parties stipulated to the invalidity of the patent
at issue in the misrepresentation claim, and the plaintiff withdrew its
request for damages for the misrepresentation. 30 2 Thus, a false advertising
claim was not at issue in KIS, rather the only claim at issue was one of false
endorsement under the false association prong of section 43(a). 30 3
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit's statement in McDonald's that KIS denied
standing to a direct competitor false advertising plaintiff appears to be
incorrect. 304
and direct competitors therefore "invariably satisfy" the Associated General five-factor test.
Id.
295. Id. at 1167 (quoting Conte Bros. Auto. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221,
234-36 (3d Cir. 1998)).
296. See id. (citing KIS, S.A. v. Foto Fantasy, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 608, 610-11, 616
(N.D. Tex. 2002)).
297. KIS, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
298. Id. at 609.
299. Id. at 609 n.1.
300. Id. at 609 n.2.
301. Id. at 616. The court refers to the Associated General test as the test adopted by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Procter & Gamble. See id.; see also supra Part
II.C.3.
302. KIS, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
303. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing a
false endorsement claim as falling under the false association prong of section 43(a)); see
also 43(B)Iog: False Advertising and More,
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2007/06/mcdonalds-still-lovin-it.html (June 29, 2007, 3:40 PM)
(stating that KIS involved a false endorsement claim under section 43(a)(1)(A)--the false
association prong).
304. See 43(B)log: False Advertising and More, supra note 303 (arguing that the
Eleventh Circuit misread KIS).
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McDonald's has been criticized for denying standing to a direct
competitor. Professor Rebecca Tushnet argues for the five-factor test and
asserts that "Conte Bros. depends on a background assumption that
competitors enjoy standing and the only question is how much further that
extends." 305  In her view, the McDonald's court treated the plaintiffs
argument that "direct competition was sufficient to create standing as an
argument that direct competition was necessary to create standing." 30 6
When addressing this argument, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the five-
factor test "is designed to determine whether the injury alleged is the type
of injury that the Lanham Act was designed to redress-harm to the
plaintiff's 'ability to compete' . . . and. . . 'good will and reputation' that
has been directly and proximately caused by the defendant's false
advertising." 307 Professor Tushnet, however, argues that the court's reasons
for denying standing relate only to the "directly and proximately caused"
language and are in actuality questions of materiality and consumer
effect308-two elements that a plaintiff must prove to succeed on the
merits.309 Therefore, Tushnet argues that these questions should have been
addressed at a later stage of the litigation where evidence could be
considered, not at the pleadings stage where judges rely solely on their
"hunches." 310
305. 43(B)log: False Advertising and More,
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2006/08/mcdonalds-is-lovin-it-burger-king.html (Aug. 13, 2006,
7:41 AM).
306. 43(B)log: False Advertising and More, supra note 303. Rebecca Tushnet notes that
the circuit courts disagree over whether direct competition is necessary for standing, but until
this case had agreed that direct competition was sufficient to establish standing. Id.
307. Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1167 (11th Cir.
2007).
308. 43(B)log: False Advertising and More, supra note 303. The McDonald's court
found the second factor-directness of the injury-to weigh against standing because the
plaintiff's alleged causal chain was "tenuous" and "attenuated," and the fourth factor-
speculativeness of the damages-to weigh against standing because concluding that an
ascertainable percentage of the plaintiff's loss in sales was "directly attributable" to the
misrepresentations in the advertisements would "require[] too much speculation."
McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1169-71; see also supra notes 287-89, 291 and accompanying
text.
309. See Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 310-11
(1st Cir. 2002) (stating that the elements of a false advertising claim are that "the
misrepresentation is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision," and
that "the misrepresentation actually deceives or has the tendency to deceive a substantial
segment of its intended audience"); see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
310. 43(B)log: False Advertising and More, supra note 303. In addressing the directness
of the injury, the Eleventh Circuit stated that it was "[t]aking care not to conflate the
prudential standing inquiry with the 'materiality' element [the plaintiff] must establish to
succeed on the merits of its claim." McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1170. However, Tushnet
argues that the court did exactly that. 43(B)log: False Advertising and More, supra note
303. To support this, she points to the court's statement that the outcome might have been
different "if, for example, the facts were such that McDonald's had falsely advertised the
odds of winning all of its prizes... or if McDonald's were only giving away a single prize
and falsely represented the odds of winning." McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1173. Tushnet notes
that neither of these hypothetical facts related to the factors that weighed against standing-
directness of the injury, speculativeness of the damages, and risk of duplicative damages-
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The ultimate outcome in McDonald's may have resulted from its
"unusual set of facts" in which (1) the McDonald's advertisements did not
address any attributes of their own products, plaintiffs products, or any
other product; (2) no ongoing advertisements were at issue; and (3) no
injunctive relief was sought.311  If plaintiff had sued while the
advertisements were still running and was requesting injunctive relief in
addition to damages, the court would have had to change its analysis of the
two damages factors in the Associated General test.312 Even though the
plaintiff would still have had a difficult time proving its exact damages, this
would not provide a reason for the court to deny plaintiff standing to sue for
an injunction. 313 However, this result-that a section 43(a) plaintiff may
have standing to sue for an injunction but not for damages-potentially
serves as further evidence of the incorrectness of denying a direct
competitor standing under the five-factor test.3 14
III. SECTION 43(a) FALSE ADVERTISING STANDING SHOULD BE GOVERNED
BY THE ASSOCIA TED GENERAL TEST BUT COURTS SHOULD
NOT USE THE TEST TO DENY STANDING TO DIRECT COMPETITORS
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has become an important and frequently
invoked statute. 3 15 Its statutory language provides for a potential plaintiff
class that is quite broad.3 16 While courts have uniformly agreed that some
prudential limitations on section 43(a) standing must exist,3 17 there is
and states that the court reached its decision based on its view of materiality. 43(B)log:
False Advertising and More, supra note 303. A similar criticism argues that the McDonald's
decision is "troubling conceptually" and that applying the five-factor test to deny a direct
competitor standing "seems unsound." Lawrence Weinstein & Alexander Kaplan, Barring
Direct Competitor from Standing to Claim False Advertising, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1, 2007, at S6.
The authors did not necessarily disagree with the end result of the case, but suggested that it
should have been decided under materiality, not standing. See id. ("[The] plaintiffs theory of
causation and damages was highly dubious.., and it was.., highly unlikely that the ads
contributed materially to any decline in the plaintifff's] sales. But achieving this result by a
questionable application of the prudential standing doctrine could cause further confusion in
an already unsettled area."). Additionally, though Lemley does not discuss McDonald's, he
does state, in a general discussion of section 43(a) standing, that a competitor "clearly" has
standing to bring a claim against another competitor based on the statutory language.
Lemley, supra note 266, at 290.
311. Weinstein & Kaplan, supra note 310.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id. ("[T]he notion that a party could have standing to sue for an injunction but
not damages runs afoul of the statutory language and more than a half-century of Lanham
Act jurisprudence."). Lawrence Weinstein and Alexander Kaplan disagreed with the holding
of McDonald's, but they noted that "[f]ortunately" the Eleventh Circuit made clear that its
holding was limited to the "unusual" set of facts before it. Id.; see also 43(B)log: False
Advertising and More, supra note 303 (predicting that future courts will limit McDonald's to
its facts).
315. See supra notes 99-100, 111 and accompanying text.
316. The operative standing language is "any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
317. See supra Part 1.C.
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considerable disagreement over the proper scope of these limitations.318
Part II of this Note examined the three approaches to section 43(a) false
advertising standing currently in use in the federal circuits. Part III
advocates that courts should adopt the Associated General five-factor
standing test because it is consistent with the purposes of the Lanham Act
and strikes an appropriate balance between the Ninth Circuit's discernibly
competitive injury approach and the reasonable interest approach employed
by the First and Second Circuits. 319 In addition, this part argues that direct
competitors should not be denied standing under the five-factor test. 320
A. The Associated General Test Is Consistent with the Lanham Act's
Purposes and Is Flexible Enough to Handle Varying Factual Scenarios
The Ninth Circuit's discernibly competitive injury approach and the
reasonable interest approach of the First and Second Circuits are nearly
polar opposites. The Ninth Circuit's approach is rigid and leaves little to
the court's discretion: a competitor alleging a discernibly competitive
injury will have standing and a noncompetitor can never have standing. 321
This approach is designed to serve the Lanham Act's purpose of preventing
unfair competition, which the Ninth Circuit viewed as requiring a
competitive injury.322 Leading commentators, however, have rejected this
view, and the Ninth Circuit's approach has been subject to significant
criticism.323
The First and Second Circuits' approach, on the other hand, is a flexible
one. 324 Under this approach, standing does not depend on the label placed
on the parties' relationship, but on the nature of the interest the plaintiff is
seeking to protect, the likelihood of injury to this interest, and the alleged
injury's causal connection to the defendant's false advertising. 325 These
factors are analyzed under a reasonableness standard, which gives the
courts discretion to allow a broader class of plaintiffs to bring suit. 326
Where the plaintiff is a direct competitor, this approach functions in
substantially the same way as the Ninth Circuit's approach, as direct
competitors are treated extremely favorably and are only required to make a
minimal showing to have standing. 327 The reasonable interest approach
differs from the Ninth Circuit's competitive requirements in that it allows
318. See generally supra Part II.
319. See infra Part III.A.
320. See infra Part III.B.
321. See supra Part II.A.
322. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
324. See supra text accompanying note 217. See generally supra Part II.B (explaining
the similarities between the First and Second Circuits' approaches).
325. See supra notes 208-10, 214-16 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 208-20 and accompanying text (explaining that this approach allows
noncompetitor plaintiffs to have standing).
327. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
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noncompetitors to have standing, though they are at a disadvantage in
establishing the necessary injury and causation. 328
This approach better comports with the purposes of section 43(a) than the
Ninth Circuit's approach. Section 43(a) was designed to protect both
commercial entities and consumers. 329 Under the Ninth Circuit's test,
however, only competitive interests are given the protection of section
43(a). 330 The reasonable interest approach, meanwhile, recognizes that
noncompetitors can have sufficient commercial interests to warrant
standing, and in certain cases, this recognition can lead to consumer
protection that would not exist under the Ninth Circuit's approach.
In Camel Hair,331 for example, the First Circuit reached a fair result in
line with the congressional intent behind section 43(a) by granting standing
to a noncompetitor plaintiff. The plaintiff organization's members-
cashmere and camel hair manufacturers or marketers-had a clear interest
in preventing retailers from falsely indicating that their products contained
high amounts of cashmere. 332 If the defendant retailers continued their
conduct, lower quality goods would continue to be passed off as high
quality cashmere. This would likely have had a detrimental effect on
cashmere's reputation among consumers, and thus a detrimental effect on
the plaintiffs members' commercial interests. Further, by overpaying for
low quality goods, the consumers of cashmere were significantly injured by
these false representations, more so than in a case of a defendant simply
making false statements about a plaintiffs competing product, which would
pass the Ninth Circuit standing test. If, for example, the mislabeling of
cashmere content was standard practice among retailers, it would take a
noncompetitor such as any of the plaintiffs members in Camel Hair to
protect consumers' interests, since no competitor would have the
motivation to bring suit.333  Thus, it seems fair to allow the plaintiffs
328. See supra notes 208-10, 218-24 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text; see also McCarthy, supra note 66, §
27.32, at 27-67 (stating that "[t]he pass& semantic argument that there cannot be 'unfair
competition without 'competition' between the parties has often been rejected"); Bums,
supra note 93, at 836-39 (arguing that focusing on competitive interests and not on
consumer interests decreases the quality of section 43(a) false advertising suits by "open[ing]
the door" to "numerous" lawsuits with no connection to consumer injury).
331. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 204-213 and accompanying text.
332. The plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation with the goal of protecting and promoting
the interests of the cashmere and camel hair industry, and its individual members were
cashmere and camel hair manufacturers and marketers. See supra notes 205, 211 and
accompanying text.
333. This hypothetical demonstrates an example of an information-distressed market, as
discussed by Professor Lemley, supra note 266. Lemley supported granting noncompetitors
standing in such circumstances, though his discussion was in the context of the Associated
General test. See supra note 266. Lemley proposed modifying the directness factor of the
Associated General test to account for these markets. See id. This idea is consistent with
what is being proposed here-that standing should not be limited to direct competitors,
because in certain situations direct competitors with the ability to bring a false advertising
claim may not be motivated to do so. Note that the third factor of the Associated General
test-the proximity or remoteness of the plaintiff to the false advertising-already takes this
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members in Camel Hair who, though not competitors, had a commercial
interest in stopping the defendants' behavior, to bring suit to protect their
interests as well as to protect consumers from continued exposure to the
defendants' wrongful conduct.
The reasonable interest approach is not without its problems, however.
There is no set rule defining what constitutes a reasonable interest,
reasonable basis, or sufficient causal nexus. 334 District courts are given
little guidance as to what is sufficient to satisfy each of these requirements,
and in many instances, courts can only look to past cases to try to determine
whether the current plaintiff's interest is reasonable. 335  In deciding to
replace its reasonable interest test with the Associated General test, the
Third Circuit noted that its past cases "grappled with defining [reasonable
interest] with greater precision. '336  The Third Circuit adopted the
Associated General test because it felt the test was an "appropriate method
for adding content to [the court's] 'reasonable interest' test."'337 Thus,
unsurprisingly, there are similarities between the two tests. The first two
Associated General factors-nature of the injury and directness of the
injury-require inquiries similar to the reasonable interest and reasonable
basis requirements. 338 In addition, reasonable interest courts have also
considered the fourth factor of the Associated General test: the
speculativeness of the damages. 339
An advantage of the Associated General test, however, is that it divides
these analyses into separate inquiries, providing courts with clearer
guidance. 340 Though some of the individual factors may not provide a clear
into account by advising courts to inquire whether there is "an identifiable class of persons
[more proximate to the harm] whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate
the public interest" by bringing an action. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983). In cases involving information-
distressed markets, such a class would not exist since the direct competitors would not be
motivated to bring suit against one another.
334. See Conte Bros. Auto. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 230-31 (3d Cir.
1998) (explaining that, prior to adopting the five-factor test, the Third Circuit applied the
reasonable interest test and "grappled with defining the term with greater precision"). The
court further stated that it "never precisely defined the critical term 'reasonable interest."' Id.
at 230; see also Lemley, supra note 266, at 302 (arguing that the Third Circuit's previous
test did not provide a proper framework for the term reasonable interest).
335. See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 694-95 (2d Cir. 1994)
(examining the facts and holdings of several past cases to determine what constituted a
sufficient demonstration of injury and causation for the present case); Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l
Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1173-77 (3d Cir. 1993) (undergoing an extensive discussion of prior
case law and commentary to answer questions regarding what qualifies as a reasonable
interest).
336. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 231.
337. Id. at 233.
338. See supra note 263.
339. See id.
340. Certain factors are more clear-cut than others. For example, the third factor-
proximity to the harmful conduct-instructs courts to identify whether there is an
"identifiable class" of potential plaintiffs more proximate to the conduct motivated to bring
suit. See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1170 (1 1th Cir.
2007). Meanwhile, the second and fourth factors are more open-ended-whether the alleged
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test for the court, 34 1 the overall analysis under the test is significantly more
structured. 342 In addition, the five-factor test gives courts more flexibility
than the reasonable interest approach, as failure to satisfy one or more of the
five factors does not automatically preclude standing. 343  Courts have
recognized this flexibility as a significant advantage of the Associated
General test, and they have found that it is easily adaptable to "disparate
factual scenarios." 344 This flexibility, for example, allows courts to deny
standing on a particular set of facts and to recognize standing on a slight
variation of those same facts if the circumstances warrant it. 345
Finally, the Associated General test is consistent with the purposes of
section 43(a). The test is focused on commercial injury, and the first factor
specifically questions whether the alleged injury is one that the Lanham Act
was designed to protect. Like the reasonable interest approach, standing
under the test is not limited to competitors, which can increase consumer
protection, another goal of section 43(a). One commentator has stated that
the five factors "serve the ultimate purpose" of section 43(a) and
"construct[] the proper framework to serve the policy [underlying section
43(a)] without narrowing false advertising." 346
B. Direct Competitors Bringing Section 43(a) False Advertising Claims
Should Satisfy the Associated General Prudential Standing Test
In McDonald's, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Associated General test
and held that a direct competitor failed to meet the prudential standing
requirements. 34 7  In addressing the argument that direct competitors
"invariably satisfy" the five-factor test, the McDonald's court rejected the
argument that the Third Circuit adopted the test "to extend prudential
standing to parties who are not in direct or actual competition." 348 This part
argues that direct competitors alleging a competitive injury should always
satisfy the Associated General test.
In support of its position, the McDonald's court noted that prior to Conte
Bros., the Third Circuit used a version of the reasonable interest test, which
did not require plaintiffs to be the defendants' competitors. 349 However,
injury is sufficiently direct and whether the damages are too speculative. See supra text
accompanying note 255.
341. See supra note 340.
342. See Lemley, supra note 266, at 302, 300 (stating that the Third Circuit's reasonable
interest test, prior to Conte Bros., "failed to provide a proper framework for evaluating
reasonable interest" and that the adoption of the five-factor test "defined and provided the
legal framework of the 'reasonable interest').
343. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
344. McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1173 (calling this flexibility a "salient virtue" of the test).
345. See id.
346. Lemley, supra note 266, at 306.
347. See supra Part lI.C.4.
348. McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1166-67 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra
notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
349. See McDonald's, 489 F.3d at 1166-67. The court also quoted Conte Bros. and
stated that, under the five-factor test, "'standing ... does not turn on the label placed on the
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the Conte Bros. court also stated that it was adopting the Associated
General test not because it wanted to replace its reasonable interest test, but
rather because the Associated General test "provide[d] an appropriate
method for adding content" to its reasonable interest test. 350 When the
Third Circuit first adopted the reasonable interest test in Thorn v. Reliance
Van Co., the court was considering whether a noncompetitor had standing
to sue under section 43(a). 351 After concluding that "the mere fact that [the
plaintiff] is not a competitor of [the defendant] does not, in and of itself,
preclude him from bringing suit under section 43(a)," the court considered
whether there were "any prudential reasons which support a judicial
determination that [the plaintiff] is without standing. '352 The court then
adopted the reasonable interest test as the "dispositive question" in
determining a party's prudential standing, and held that the noncompetitor
plaintiff had standing.353 A later Third Circuit case stated that the Thorn
court's determination that the plaintiff had standing "permitted a false
advertising suit by one who, while not in his own person a competitor...
was... so situated that he could quite reasonably be regarded as a surrogate
for such competitor. ' 354 Taken together, these cases imply that the Third
Circuit developed its reasonable interest test to extend prudential standing
beyond direct competitor plaintiffs and that the Third Circuit was not
concerned with the issue of direct competitors satisfying the prudential
standing requirements. 355
The Eleventh Circuit's decision to deny standing has also been criticized
for conflating section 43(a) false advertising standing with the merits of a
false advertising claim. 356 The McDonald's court recognized that the
plaintiff was the most appropriate party to bring a false advertising claim
and that it alleged an injury of the type the Lanham Act was designed to
protect. 35 7 It denied plaintiff standing primarily because plaintiffs alleged
causal chain was tenuous, which led to a speculative damages claim.358
The McDonald's court did not believe that the advertisements'
misrepresentations about the chance of winning one of the "rare" high-value
prizes would lure customers from Burger King to McDonald's and lead to
an "ascertainable" loss in Burger King's sales.359  However, as the
criticisms note, this skepticism relates to the materiality element necessary
relationship between the parties."' Id. at 1164 (quoting Conte Bros. Auto. v. Quaker State-
Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 1998)).
350. Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 233.
351. Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 931-32 (3d Cir. 1984).
352. Id. at 933.
353. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
354. Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993).
355. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 286, 290 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 287-89, 291 and accompanying text; see also supra note 293 and
accompanying text.
359. See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1169-71 (1 1th
Cir. 2007).
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to succeed on the merits of a section 43(a) false advertising claim, and
should have been considered at a later stage of the litigation where the
plaintiff could have introduced evidence as to its lost sales. 360 The Lanham
Act focuses on preventing unfair competition, and where a direct
competitor is alleging a competitive injury of the type the Lanham Act was
designed to protect, that plaintiff should be given an opportunity to present
his case at trial.
CONCLUSION
Courts should determine prudential standing for false advertising claims
brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act with the five-factor
Associated General test. This test better conforms to the purposes of the
Lanham Act than the Ninth Circuit's discernibly competitive injury
approach by not limiting standing to competitive injuries. Section 43(a)
aims to protect commercial interests, and the case law and commentaries
demonstrate that noncompetitors can allege sufficient commercial interests
to invoke the protection of the statute. Additionally, the Associated
General test is more likely to lead to results in line with the purposes
behind section 43(a) because it requires courts to focus on the nature of the
injury the plaintiff is alleging, not solely on the relationship between the
parties. Though the reasonable interest approach of the First and Second
Circuits also focuses on the plaintiffs alleged injury, the Associated
General factors provide courts with clearer guidance. Additionally, the
Associated General test provides courts with the flexibility to reach proper
outcomes in cases covering a wide variety of factual scenarios.
While the proper focus of a section 43(a) standing inquiry is on the
nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury, courts applying the Associated
General test should incorporate one aspect of the Ninth Circuit's approach:
direct competitors alleging a competitive injury of the type the Lanham Act
was designed to protect should have standing. To deny standing to a
plaintiff alleging a commercial injury caused by the conduct of a direct
competitor distorts section 43(a)'s purpose of preventing unfair competition
in commerce. In McDonald's, the court recognized that the class of Burger
King franchisees was alleging the type of harm the Lanham Act was
designed to address and was the most appropriate class to bring a section
43(a) claim. Yet the court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing,
primarily because it doubted that the plaintiff would be able to prove an
ascertainable amount of damages, which goes to the claim's merits, not
standing. Additionally, the Third Circuit first adopted the Associated
General test to clarify and add content to its version of the reasonable
interest test, not to abandon the test's underlying principles. Courts
applying versions of the reasonable interest test have traditionally been
quite deferential to direct competitor plaintiffs' allegations of damages and
causation. Further, case law reveals that the Third Circuit's reasonable
360. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
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interest test was originally adopted as a way of extending section 43(a)
standing beyond direct competitors. Courts should apply the Associated
General test in the same context and should not use the test to deny
standing to direct competitors.
